Articles & Papers

This article focuses on the question, which kind of diplomacy we have to deal with within the Warsaw pact states. Taking the invasion in Czechoslovakia in 1968 as an example, three theses are discussed: (1) Brezhnev transferred his inner-party concept of „trust in cadres“ and his „scenario of power“ based on trust to foreign politics and treated Dubček as a client whom he addressed in a patrimonial and familiar way. (2) He lost faith in Dubček when the latter established a new democratic discourse denying the central power of the party. (3) The diplomatic language within the Warsaw pact states referred more to socialist common values and party discipline than to the language and setting of international meetings with third party states.

This article describes the historical context that was decisive in Saharov’s commitment to warning party leaders of the dangers of the H-bomb and calling on them to respect human rights. He also attempts to explore the different ways in which Hruščev and Brežnev approached Saharov’s criticisms. Not only does he examine the three stages of the KGB model – educate, warn and only finally arrest renegades – he also sheds light on Andropov’s repeated appeals to Brežnev to speak with Saharov. Although Saharov, too, was keen to talk to Brežnev, the meeting between the two men never took place. In the end, it was against the backdrop of the Cold War that the Politbjuro decided on the best time to get rid of Saharov, doing as little damage as possible to the prestige of the Soviet Union, and thus re-establishing the limits of the dictable.